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PUBLIC LAW 
 
 
More Disagreement Over Human Dignity:  Federal Con-
stitutional Court’s Most Recent Benetton Advertising 
Decision 
 
By Craig Smith* 
 
 
 
Article 1 is the Basic Law’s crown.  The concept of human dignity is this crown’s 
jewel: an interest so precious that the state must affirmatively protect and foster its 
inviolability.  This uniquely important status is evident from human dignity’s 
prominence in the constitution, the early Federal Republic’s pressing need to repu-
diate the Third Reich, the many judicial and scholarly exegeses of Article 1, and 
human dignity’s unique claim to absolute protection.  The success of the German 
legal construct of human dignity also is apparent from its influence on the Euro-
pean Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.  That document likewise begins with 
a provision nearly identical to the Basic Law’s Article 1.1 
 
Human dignity is also one of the most elusive concepts in German constitutional 
law.  It is the “foundation of all fundamental rights,” which in turn collectively are 
Konkretisierungen (concretizations or concrete forms) of the Basic Law’s “principle of 
human dignity.”2  Elusive concepts offer judges great power because they are suffi-
ciently malleable to mean many different things to well-meaning interpreters.  The 
malleability of the Basic Law’s human dignity concept has been prominently dis-
played in recent years.  Disagreements over its substantive content have bounced 
back and forth in Karlsruhe between two of Germany’s most important courts in 
the Benetton Advertising Cases.  Twice the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH – Federal Court of 
Justice) has discerned a violation of human dignity in a Benetton print advertise-
                                                 
*  Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Legal Writing, Vanderbilt University Law School.  B.A. 
William & Mary 1985; J.D. Michigan 1991; LL.M. Potsdam University, Germany 1995.  Member of the 
Board of Editors of GERMAN LAW JOURNAL. 
1  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Ofcl. J. E.C. 2000/C 364/01. 
2 BVerfG 1 BvR 426/02 of 11 March 2003, Slip Opinion ¶ 26 (available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030311_1bvr042602.html). 
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ment.3  The ad displayed, above the clothing company’s name in small letters, na-
ked human buttocks stamped with the phrase “H.I.V. POSITIVE.”  Twice now, 
however, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) has 
overruled its Karlsruhe neighbor.4  It did so most recently on March 11, 2003, hold-
ing that Article 1 of the Basic Law does not justify banning the press from distribut-
ing an advertiser’s depiction of suffering even though the purpose of that depiction 
is to generate commercial profits. 
 
The Federal Court of Justice first upheld prohibition of the Benetton ad and of oth-
ers like it in 1995.  The Court concluded that publication of the ad violated the gute 
Sitten (good morals or customs) requirement imposed by the Gesetz gegen den 
Unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG – Unfair Competition Act).  By depicting persons 
infected with the AIDS virus as stamped, stigmatized, and excluded from society, 
the Court explained, the ad unlawfully engendered pity among consumers and 
exploited this feeling for competitive commercial purposes.5  The ad also would 
have to be viewed at least by AIDS sufferers as injurious to human dignity.6  
 
The Federal Constitutional Court’s December 2000 opinion reversed this holding.  
The Court remanded the case to the Federal Court of Justice with instructions to 
reinterpret the ad using proper conceptions of human dignity and of the freedoms 
of expression and the press protected by the Basic Law’s Article 5.7  The judges 
were in particular told to view the ad as subject to varying interpretations.  They 
also were told not to construe Article 5 of the Basic Law as permitting prohibition 
of an ad simply because the ad exploits “empathy with grave suffering” for com-
mercial purposes.8  Freedom of the press does not shield ads that violate human 
dignity from liability under the Unfair Competition Act, the Court explained.9  The 
                                                 
3  BGH I ZR 180/94 (6 July 1995); BGHZ 149, 247 (I ZR 284/00, 6 December 2001), Slip Opinion avail-
able at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/.  See German Law Journal, Volume 2, Number 1 (15 
January 2001). 
4  The first decision (BVerfGE 102, 347) came on 12 December 2000.  See German Law Journal, Volume 
2, Number 1 (15 January 2001).  The second is BVerfG 1 BvR 426/02 of 11 March 2003. 
5  See BVerfGE 102, 347, Slip Opinion at ¶¶ 5, 10, 68 (summarizing BGH I ZR 180/94 of 6 July 1995); 
BVerfG 1 BvR 426/02 of 11 March 2003, Slip Opinion at ¶ 3 (same). 
6  BVerfGE 102, 347, Slip Opinion at ¶¶ 10, 68 (summarizing BGH I ZR 180/94 of 6 July 1995). 
7  Id. at ¶ 72. 
8  Id. at ¶ 61. 
9  Id. at ¶ 66. 
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Federal Court of Justice, however, had improperly overlooked possible interpreta-
tions of the ad, and under these interpretations the ad would not violate human 
dignity.10  Consequently, banning the ads violated freedom of the press.11  
  
On reconsideration of the case, the Federal Court of Justice again found a violation 
of the Unfair Competition Act.12  The Constitutional Court’s decision of December 
2000 did not, the Federal Court of Justice reasoned, require judges to rely on factual 
evidence regarding how the public actually viewed the ad.  To the contrary, the 
judges could rely on their general life experience in determining the meaning and 
impact of the ad.13  This time, however, the judges concluded that the ad was a 
provocation that communicated no particular message.14  The ad instead aimed to 
gain viewers’ attention and then left them to interpret and evaluate the ad freely.15  
The ad perhaps called for solidarity with suffering human beings, but only cyni-
cally; profit was the real motive.16  A vast majority of AIDS sufferers would feel that 
the ad minimized or demeaned their human dignity, and this violated their right to 
enjoy respect and compassionate solidarity.17  Hence the ad misused a depiction of 
suffering:  The ad violated human dignity by using such a depiction simply for the 
advertiser’s commercial purposes of provoking viewers to gain attention and in-
crease profits.18  In addition, publishing the ad constituted unfair competition be-
cause the ad could harass the public, engendering fear of AIDS and unacceptably 
confronting persons affected by AIDS with their own suffering in the form of ad-
vertising.19  With this revised reasoning, the Federal Court of Justice reinstated the 
                                                 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  BGHZ 149, 247 (6 December 2001). 
13  Id., Slip Opinion at 26-27. 
14  BVerfG 1 BvR 426/02 of 11 March 2003, Slip Opinion at ¶¶ 5-7 (summarizing BGHZ 149, 247).   
15  Id. 
16  BGHZ 149, 247 (6 December 2001), Slip Opinion at 26-27. 
17  Id. at 14. 
18  Id. at 24-25. 
19 Id. at 27-28.  See BVerfG 1 BvR 426/02 of 11 March 2003, Slip Opinion at ¶ 28 (summarizing BGHZ 149, 
247). 
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legal conclusion that the Federal Constitutional Court had rejected in December 
2000: publishing the ad violated the Unfair Competition Act’s gute Sitten require-
ment. 
 
Responding in March 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court first repeated the as-
sertion, from its December 2000 opinion, that the ad fell within the scope or protec-
tive realm (Schutzbereich) of press freedom under the Basic Law’s Art. 5(1).20  The ad 
cannot, the Court wrote, be reduced to the mere intention to gain attention for the 
advertiser.21  The ad instead makes a social problem visible.  Therefore, the ad has 
opinion-forming content.22  
 
The Federal Constitutional Court then acknowledged that it lacks power to correct 
an interpretive error by the Federal Court of Justice unless that error has substan-
tive weight in the case and rests on a fundamentally incorrect view of a basic 
right.23  This rule imposes a high threshold the Federal Constitutional Court must 
cross before it can reverse a decision of the Court of Justice.  Nonetheless, the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court concluded that the Federal Court of Justice had again 
committed such a grave error, thereby unjustifiably restricting freedom of the 
press.24 
 
This time the error lay not, however, in improperly interpreting the ad’s meaning.  
To the contrary, the Federal Court of Justice had, as instructed by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court in its December 2000 decision, correctly found that the ad did not 
suggest that the advertiser approved of stigmatizing AIDS sufferers.  To the con-
trary, the ad could be understood positively as social criticism.25  Moreover, the 
Federal Court of Justice had correctly distinguished this expressive content of the ad 
from the advertiser’s expressive purpose – namely, increasing profits by gaining the 
public’s attention.26  This purpose forms part of the expression’s context; hence it 
                                                 
20  BVerfG 1 BvR 426/02 of 11 March 2003, Slip Opinion at 16.  Art. 5(1) GG states in part: “Everyone 
has the right to freely express and disseminate his opinion in speech, writing, and pictures ….  Free-
dom of the press … [is] guaranteed.” 
21  BVerfG 1 BvR 426/02 of 11 March 2003, Slip Opinion at ¶ 16. 
22  Id.  
23  Id. at ¶ 18 (citing BVerfGE 18, 85 (92-93).  
24  Id. at ¶ 17. 
25  Id. at ¶ 22.  See BGHZ 149, 247 (6 December 2001), Slip Opinion at 8-9. 
26  Id. at ¶¶ 23-24. 
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could indeed affect the ad’s meaning.27  The purpose could not, however, exclude 
or contradict the potential social-criticism meaning.28  One cannot conclude, the 
Federal Constitutional Court wrote, that the advertiser intended only to gain atten-
tion and to profit.29  Rather, this purpose and the critical meaning coexist “side by 
side” and without contradiction.30  Consequently, the Federal Court of Justice had 
correctly assumed that viewers could regard the ad as expressing a critical opin-
ion.31   
 
The Federal Court of Justice seriously erred, however, by using the ad’s purpose to 
establish a violation of human dignity.  This use revealed a misinterpretation of the 
scope of the limitation on freedom of expression created by Article 1’s human-
dignity protection.32  The advertisement employs the misery of AIDS sufferers for 
commercial purposes, the Federal Constitutional Court conceded.33  Noncommer-
cial depictions of suffering may be morally preferable, the Court added, but they 
are not constitutionally required.34  An ad’s content can justify prohibition of the ad 
as violative of human dignity under Unfair Competition Act.35  But an ad’s com-
mercial purpose cannot.36  The Federal Court of Justice, the Federal Constitutional 
Court concluded, improperly ruled that a profit motive can, by itself, rob an ad’s 
message of the constitutionally mandated respect for human beings that the mes-
sage otherwise possesses, thereby transforming a protected expression into an in-
fringement of the constitution.37    
                                                 
27  Id. at ¶ 24. 
28  Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at ¶¶ 21, 27. 
34 Id. at ¶ 27. 
35 Id. at ¶ 26. 
36 Id. at ¶ 27. 
37 Id. 
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The Federal Constitutional Court also rejected the Federal Court of Justice’s addi-
tional reasoning.  Protecting the public from Belästigung (harassment) likewise does 
not justify prohibiting an ad whose content addresses suffering without violating 
human dignity.38 
 
The opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court thus intriguingly seems to assert 
that the Basic Law makes the purpose of an advertiser’s expression both relevant 
and irrelevant.  Attention to the use and timing of this consideration may offer the 
best hope of unraveling this apparent paradox:  Purpose is initially relevant as con-
text but later irrelevant as a separate consideration.  Initially, as the state examines 
the expression’s meaning, the advertiser’s purpose may be relevant because it is 
context for the expression, and context can affect the expression’s meaning.39  The 
meaning must then be determinative, by itself, of whether the expression is com-
patible with Article 1’s protection of human dignity.  Thereafter, however – that is, 
once the meaning has been evaluated – the expression’s purpose lacks further rele-
vance.  It then cannot, by itself, change the constitutional analysis.  Under this in-
terpretation, the Federal Court of Justice’s error lay in regarding the advertiser’s 
profit motive as decisive even after the Court had judicially evaluated the Benetton 
ad’s meaning.40  The Court failed to distinguish between expressive purpose as 
initially relevant context and subsequently irrelevant dross.   
 
How useful such a distinction regarding advertisers’ purposes will prove to be in 
future cases is an open and interesting question.  Could an advertiser’s purpose 
decisively influence the meaning and constitutionality of that advertiser’s expres-
sion?  Could the state for example use the Unfair Competition Act to prohibit, as 
violative of human dignity, an advertisement that, though difficult to interpret, 
seems designed to help the advertiser not just profit commercially but also at the 
same time exploit and foment racial hatred?  This Benetton opinion provides little 
help in answering such a question, but the question unfortunately seems not to lie 
beyond the realm of possibility. 
 
Finally, the key to the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision may lie in the opin-
ion’s final paragraph.  Here the Court explicitly names “reality” as a compelling 
reason for judicial restraint in the case:  Forbidding commercial advertisements 
                                                 
38 Id. at ¶ 28. 
39 Id. at ¶ 24 ( “Because the advertising purpose forms part of the social-criticism message’s context, this 
purpose can influence the message’s meaning.”).    
40 Id. at ¶ 25. 
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from addressing suffering would leave no place for a substantial portion of today’s 
advertising, which is ubiquitous and powerfully influential over people’s views, 
values, and opinions.41  The Court did not add that use of commercial law to forbid 
widespread and powerful messages might soon overwhelm judges with the task of 
closely policing advertising.  But little imagination is needed to reach that conclu-
sion.  The Court instead simply reminded its readers that expression merits special 
protection whenever it addresses society’s problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Id. at ¶ 29. 
